Job Matching under Constraints-厦门大学金融系

Job Matching under Constraints
主讲人 Ning Yu 简介 <p><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span lang="EN-US">Abstract:<span lang="EN-US">In a Kelso-Crawford job market framework, we consider arbitrary constraints on the sets of doctors that hospitals can hire. Constraints preserve the substitutes condition if and only if they are generalized interval constraints. When doctors are gross substitutes, competitive equilibria always exist under mild assumptions unless the government imposes other types of constraints. Competitive equilibrium allocations of a market under interval constraints are also those of an unconstrained market with a certain government transfer policy. For markets with interval constraints and beyond, new techniques help demonstrate comparative statics.</span></span></span></span></p>
时间 2018-10-29(Monday)16:40-18:00 地点 N302, Econ Building
讲座语言 English 主办单位 SOE&WISE
承办单位 经济学系 类型 系列讲座
联系人信息 主持人 Menghan Xu
专题网站 专题
主讲人简介 <p>&nbsp;CV:<a href="/Upload/File/2018/10/20181024041909534.pdf">Upload/File/2018/10/20181024041909534.pdf</a></p> 期数 制度的经济学分析系列2018年秋季学期第二讲(总第34讲)
系列讲座