When Is Upstream Collusion Profitable?-厦门大学金融系

When Is Upstream Collusion Profitable?
主讲人 Zhiyong Yao 简介 <p>Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long-term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream without hurting the downstream. We further link the profitability of such collusions to industry characteristics in terms of demand, cost, and competition intensity.&nbsp;</p>
时间 2018-05-25(Friday)16:40-18:00 地点 D235, Econ Building
讲座语言 English 主办单位 WISE&SOE
承办单位 类型 系列讲座
联系人信息 主持人 Ziyan Yang
专题网站 专题
主讲人简介 <p>Associate Professor, School of Management, Fudan University</p> <p>Please see<span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);"><a href="/Upload/File/2018/5/20180511062158797.pdf"> <span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">Prof. Yao's CV</span></a>&nbsp;</span>for more information.</p> 期数
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