| 主讲人 |
ZHIGANG FENG |
简介 |
<div style="white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; text-transform: none; color: rgb(0,0,0); font: 14px/14px 微软雅黑; letter-spacing: normal; background-color: rgb(255,255,255); text-indent: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px"><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; line-height: 16px; background-color: window">U.S. employer-based health insurance (EHI) premiums are not subject to income or payroll taxes. This is regressive taxation because higher income individuals face higher marginal tax rates, which gives a higher EHI subsidy. We show this regressive policy mitigates misallocation between firm and self-employment from non-contractible heterogeneity in talent and health shocks. In our general equilibrium model, removing tax exclusion raises insurance premiums by 67%, coverage falls to 26.9%, and welfare decreases 1.9% due to reduced risk sharing and misallocation. If tax exclusion is extended to private insurance, coverage increases to 97.2%, workers’ taxes fall, and welfare increases 0.3%.</span></div>
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