An Experimental Analysis of Lobbying in a Regulated Common Pool Resource-厦门大学金融系

An Experimental Analysis of Lobbying in a Regulated Common Pool Resource
主讲人 Christopher M. Anderson 简介 <p>It is frequently argued that comanagement, or giving resource users a role in the regulatory process, can improve outcomes. We investigate a co management institution wherein users can influence a proposed common extraction cap through costly effort, or lobbying.&nbsp; We develop a model which makes both competitive Nash and cooperative predictions about lobbying to change inefficient initial regulations.&nbsp; We find inexperienced subjects successfully lobby to raise inefficiently low caps on effort, but are unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high caps; lobbying dissipates almost completely among experienced subjects, when free ridership in lobbying dominates potential gains from a more efficiently managed resource.&nbsp; This highlights an important limitation to participatory governance mechanisms when participation is costly.</p>
时间 2016-12-20(Tuesday)16:40-18:30 地点 经济楼A-501
讲座语言 English 主办单位 经济学院、王亚南经济研究院
承办单位 财政系 类型 独立讲座
联系人信息 主持人 李智 助理教授
专题网站 专题
主讲人简介 <p>Christopher M. Anderson,<br /> Associate Professor of Fisheries Economics<br /> School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences<br /> University of Washington</p> <p><br /> <a href="https://fish.uw.edu/faculty/chris-anderson/">https://fish.uw.edu/faculty/chris-anderson/</a> <br /> &nbsp;</p> <p><a href="/Upload/File/2016/9/20160927104257506.pdf">CV</a></p> 期数 财税名家论坛
独立讲座