Extortion can Outperform Generosity in the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
| 主讲人 |
Jie Zheng |
简介 |
<p>Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, as discovered by Press and Dyson, can enforce a linear relationship between a pair of players’ scores in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Particularly, the Extortionate ZD strategies can enforce and exploit cooperation, providing a player with a score advantage, and consequently higher scores than those from either mutual cooperation or Generous ZD strategies. In laboratory experiments in which human subjects were paired with computer co-players, we demonstrate that both the Generous and the Extortionate ZD strategies indeed enforce a unilateral control of the reward. When the experimental setting is sufficiently long and the computerized nature of the opponent is known to human subjects, the Extortionate strategy outperforms the Generous strategy. Human subjects’ cooperation rates when playing against Extortionate and Generous ZD strategies are similar after learning has occurred. More than half of Extortionate strategists finally obtain an average score higher than that from mutual cooperation.</p> |
| 时间 |
2016-03-03(Thursday)16:40-18:00 |
地点 |
N303, Econ Building |
| 讲座语言 |
English |
主办单位 |
WISE & SOE |
| 承办单位 |
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类型 |
系列讲座 |
| 联系人信息 |
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主持人 |
Yun Wang |
| 专题网站 |
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专题 |
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| 主讲人简介 |
<p>Assistant Professor of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University</p>
<p>Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (2015.9-2016.3)</p>
<p><a href="/Upload/File/2016/2/20160219090753137.pdf"><u><strong><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 255);">Prof. Jie Zheng's CV</span></strong></u></a></p> |
期数 |
“WISE-SOE”高级经济学系列讲座2016春季学期第一讲（总第359讲） |
