| 主讲人 |
Rong Kang |
简介 |
<div>Abstract: This paper studies the problem of the provision of a public good in a commu-</div>
<div>nity, where citizens (or, agents) in the community have private valuations about the public</div>
<div>good. A public good provision mechanism, proposed by the government (or, the principal), is</div>
<div>a mapping from agents’ reported valuations to the decisions of whether to provide the public</div>
<div>good and also how to allocate the cost of the public good among agents should the public</div>
<div>good be provided. A key assumption of our model is that the principal faces a constitutional</div>
<div>constraint in the sense that in order for a mechanism to be implemented, the mechanism</div>
<div>must first be approved by agents under a prespecified voting rule. We find that as long as the</div>
<div>voting rule is not the unanimity rule, then the principal can design a mechanism such that</div>
<div>first-best efficiency of the provision of the public good is always achieved. We also consider</div>
<div>various constraints which may prevent our mechanism from proper functioning (such as the</div>
<div>prohibition of the use of discriminatory mechanisms, or the existence of interest groups and</div>
<div>vote buying). We discuss the optimal voting rule in such situations.</div>
<div>Keywords: Public goods; Voting; Efficiency.</div>
<div>JEL classification: D82, H41, D72</div> |
