| 主讲人 |
Wooyoung Lim |
简介 |
<div>Abstract</div>
<div>Current papers (Avery 1998, Daniel and Hirshleifer 1998) conclude that seller’s</div>
<div>revenue decreases when jump bidding occurs, which is in sharp contrast to the fact</div>
<div>that jump bidding is allowed rather than forbidden by sellers in real-life auctions (e.g., Sotheby’s auctions, the FCC spectrum auctions). We conduct laboratory experiments of private-value auctions, and confirm that seller’s revenue increases significantly when jump bidding is allowed. We rationalize our experimental findings by providing a novel theory of jump bidding, which shows that jump bidding equilibria dominate the no-jump equilibrium regarding seller’s revenue, when bidders are risk averse.</div>
<div> </div> |
