Information Design for Social Learning with Patient Agents
主讲人 Chen Lyu 简介 <p>Agents arriving sequentially may adopt a new technology. Early adoption reveals information about its value, but individuals tend to wait and free-ride on information generated by others. Facing this challenge, we study how a designer&mdash;who controls the public release of past information&mdash;can improve social learning efficiency. The optimal design follows a threshold stopping rule, which keeps recommending adoption until the designer&rsquo;s belief becomes more pessimistic than a time-varying threshold. This threshold typically starts above the first-best threshold, drops below it in some later periods, and eventually returns to it. Meanwhile, public information flow is restrained by over-recommending adoption, but not by under-recommending. We also examine special cases of conclusive-news learning. In good-news environments, the optimal design terminates exploration in a random manner; in bad-news environments, adoption may continue even after bad news arrives.</p>
时间 2026-09-17 (Thursday) 16:40-18:00 地点 Room N302, Economics Building
讲座语言 English 主办单位 厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院、邹至庄经济研究院
承办单位 厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院、邹至庄经济研究院 类型 系列讲座
联系人信息 叶老师,电话2181098,邮箱yhye.wise@xmu.edu.cn 主持人 陈琬祎
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主讲人简介 <p>吕辰现为北京大学汇丰商学院助理教授。主要从事信息经济学相关的应用微观理论研究,重点关注信息设计及其在产业组织、平台推荐等方面的应用。两篇研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory。</p> 期数 高级经济学系列讲座2026年秋季学期第一讲(总504讲)
会议