发表期刊：Journal of Comparative Economics
发表时间：September 2025
作者及单位：Qingfeng Cai(School of Economics, Xiamen University), Dongxu Li*(School of Economics, Wangyanan Institute for Economic Studies, Laboratory of Digital Finance, Xiamen University), Hao Liu
摘要：Social minority benefits from in-group favoritism, and companies may leverage it as a non-pecuniary strategy to access political capital. We examine gendered implications of corporate responses to city-level political turnovers, specifically when the leadership shifts from male to female politician. We show that the politician turnover induces firms headquartered in that city to increase the presence of women on the board of directors, particularly in the chairman or CEO position. This result is unlikely driven by gender equality concerns or other firm characteristics. Firms selecting a female director witness significantly increased financial support from the government. This paper suggests that gender minority can be a subtle way accessing political capital, and boosting female representation can help curb the in-group favoritism.
关键词：Gender minority；Political capital；Gender；Board of directors
