发表期刊：Journal of Corporate Finance
发表时间：March 2026
作者及单位：Ming Gu(School of Economics & WangYanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University), Dongxu Li*(School of Economics & WangYanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) & Laboratory of Digital Finance, Xiamen University ), Zhitao Xiong
摘要：Complementing existing research on the inefficiencies of regulatory fragmentation, this study identifies a potential benefit: firms facing greater regulatory fragmentation experience lower stock price crash risk. Mechanism analyses suggest that such fragmentation enhances financial reporting quality, mitigates stock overpricing, and improves the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Firms subject to regulatory fragmentation also hold more cash and are less likely to pay dividends or repurchase shares. These findings indicate that the reduction in crash risk is associated with improved information disclosure and more conservative financial policies. Consistent with this notion, the effect is more pronounced among firms with high information uncertainty and tight financial constraints. Overall, this study sheds light on the ongoing discussion regarding optimal regulatory oversight schemes.
关键词：Regulatory fragmentation; Stock price crash risk; Information disclosure; Financial conservatism; Mispricing
