发表期刊：Economics Letters
发表时间：May 2026
作者及单位：Xu Lin*, Mengnan Zhu(School of Economics, Xiamen University)
摘要：Exposure to customers undergoing regulatory deleveraging impairs suppliers’ cash flow by locking up capital in receivables. Exploiting “Three Red Lines” policy as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that regulated real estate firms increase the scale of accounts payable by 24.6 % and extend payment duration by 21.7 %. We identify two channels: The policy tightens regulated firms’ external financing and make them leverage bargaining power to occupy trade credit. Moreover, regulated firms actively replace existing partners with smaller suppliers. Suppliers’ bargaining power mitigates this trade credit occupation, whereas customers with lower cash holdings are more likely to implement exploitation.
关键词：Three red lines policy; Accounts payable; Financing constraints; Supplier bargaining power
